The concept of paradeduction is presented in order to justify that we can overlook contradictory information taking into account only what is consistent. Besides that, paradeduction is used to show that there is a way to transform any logic, introduced as an axiomatic formal system, into a paraconsistent one.
Introduction
As usual, we take a consequence structure as a pair (X, Cn) such that X is a non-empty set and Cn is an operation in the powerset of X:
It is well known that if A ⊆ X, then Cn(A) is the set of consequences of A. Moreover, if Cn(A) = X, we say that A is Cn-consistent. Exploring logics from this abstract perspective is the basic idea developed by A. Tarski in [8] and [9] .
Dealing with consequence structures (i.e. logics) in a recent paper (see [4] ), we have proposed a method to show that it is possible to turn any explosive logic into a system able to deal with contradictions, answering, therefore, a problem posed in [2] : how to convert a given explosive logic into a paraconsistent one? We have used concepts from category theory to define an endofunctor in the category of consequence structures in such a way that given a logic in which ex falso holds we are able to generate a paraconsistent counterpart of it by means of a paraconsistentization functor.
Indeed, we have showed that, given a consequence structure (X, Cn), it is feasible to construct a paraconsistent version of it, denoted by (X, Cn P ), in such a way that, for A ⊆ X and a ∈ X, we have that: a ∈ Cn P (A) if, and only if, there is a A ′ ⊆ A Cn-consistent such that a ∈ Cn(A ′ ). This is highly abstract. So, in this paper, the syntactical notion of axiomatic formal system is presented as well as the semantical notion of valuation structures. Then, given an axiomatic formal system S with an underlying notion of deduction in S, we build the concept of paradeduction in S which will have a close connection with the construction proposed in [4] . Using syntactical as well semantical consequence relations we are able to determine whether some metalogical properties are invariant under paraconsistentization providing, thus, an answer to a question left open in [4] .
Axiomatic formal systems
From the viewpoint of proof theory, logics can be introduced in some different ways. A logician could use Gentzen-style presentations such as natural deduction or sequent calculi. Alternatively, logics could be proof-theoretically introduced by methods such as resolution or tableaux, or even any other method still waiting to be developed could be used. In this paper, we take into consideration logics developed by means of axiomatic systems (i.e. a Hilbert-style systems). These are our axiomatic formal systems. In order to proceed from this syntactical perspective, we begin with somewhat standard terminology in the realm of proof theory.
Let n be a positive integer and X a set (non-empty). We denote by ℘ (n) (X), the set of subsets of X with cardinal n, i.e.,
An inference rule of degree n on X is a binary relation R such that
If the pair ({x 1 , ..., x n }, x) ∈ R, we say that x is an immediate consequence of {x 1 , ..., x n } in virtue of the application of the inference rule R. In this case, we can use the following notation:
Let R be a family of inference rules on X. We say that x is an immediate consequence of {x 1 , ..., x n } if x is an immediate consequence of {x 1 , ..., x n } in virtue of the application of an inference rule R ∈ R.
A formal system S is a triple S = (X, A, R) in which X is a non-empty set whose elements are called formulas of S; A is a subset of X whose elements are called axioms of S; and R is a finite family of inference rules on X.
Consider a formal system S = (X, A, R) and let A ⊆ X. A finite sequence a 1 , ..., a n of elements of X is called a S-deduction (or a deduction in S) from A, if for each 1 ≤ i ≤ n, it is the case that:
3. a i is a consequence of precedent formulas in the sequence by the application of an inference rule.
We say that a formula a ∈ X is S-deducible from a set A of formulas if there is a S-deduction, a 1 , ..., a n , from A, such that a = a n . To indicate that a is S-deductible from A we use the following notation:
Moreover, we say that a sequence a 1 , ..., a n is a S-deduction of a from A. If A is a subset of X, we denote by Cn S (A) the set of all the elements of X which are S-deducible of A, i.e:
We say that A ⊆ X is S-consistent if and only if Cn S (A) = X. Otherwise, A is said S-inconsistent. We denote by CON S the set of all subsets Sconsistent of X. In our formal systems, we always suppose that ∅ is Sconsistent (or, equivalently, there is at least one S-consistent set). We say also that A is a S-theory if and only if Cn S (A) = A. T HE S denotes the set of all S-theories and T HE * S refers to the set T HE S ∩ CON S of S-consistent theories.
It is well known that the following properties hold:
The notion described by CON S is eminently syntactical considering that it deals with provability (i.e., deducibility). A formula is deducible -in a given formal system -from a set of formulas by the application of inference rules. As it is largely known, logics, in general, have two important sides, which are indeed complementary, one of them is the proof-theoretical, the other one is the semantical, which we consider in the next section.
Valuation structures
From the model-theoretical viewpoint, logics can also be introduced in very different ways. A modal logician could use Kripke semantics to establish truth-conditions for modal operators. Or an intuitionistic logician could use the BHK-interpretation to analyze logical connectives. Many-valued matrices are also at disposal to provide semantics for a given formal language. No matter which semantical technology is used, what is important is to be able to interpret a given language. Semantically, we use valuation structures. We begin with some standard terminology (see, for instance, [6] ).
A valuation structure is a pair (X, V) in which X is a non-empty set and V is a family of functions of the form:
which do not contain the constant function 1 : X → {0, 1}, such that 1(x) = 1 for all x ∈ X. Elements of V are called valuations for X.
Let A ⊆ X. The set of V-models of A, denoted by Mod V (A), is given by:
In a similar way, if a ∈ X, then the set of V-models of a is given by:
It is easy to see that
Consider, now, a valuation structure (X, V) and let A ⊆ X and a ∈ X. We say that a is a V-consequence of A if and only if all V-model of A is also a V-model of a. In this case, we use the notation A |= V a. Therefore, we have that:
In the same way we have done for formal systems, we define the set of V-consequences of a subset A ⊆ X as:
It is also well known that for valuation structures the following properties hold:
Now, there are some known useful connections between axiomatic formal systems and valuation structures which are important for our purposes here.
Let S = (X, A, R) be a formal system and consider a valuation structure (X, V). Note that the carrier set of a valuation structure is precisely the set X of S formulas. We say that the valuation structure (X, V) is sound with respect to the formal system S if and only if for all A ⊆ X and a ∈ X we
We say that the valuation structure (X, V) is complete with respect to the formal system S if and only if for all A ⊆ X and a ∈ X we have that: if
We say that the valuation structure (X, V) is adequate with respect to the formal system S if and only if it is sound and complete for S , i.e., for all A ⊆ X and a ∈ X we have that: A ⊢ S a if and only if A |= V a. In this case, Cn S (A) = Cn V (A), for all A ⊆ X.
FACT: For all formal system S = (X, A, R) there is a valuation structure (X, V) which is adequate for S.
This can be easily proved considering T HE * S , the class of S-consistent theories, and taking as V the characteristic functions of elements of T HE * S . Lemma 3.1 Let S = (X, A, R) be a formal system and (X, V) a valuation structure. Then, it follows:
Proof. i. Consider A ⊆ X, S-consistent and assume, by reductio ad absurdum, that A is V-unsatisfiable, i.e., Mod V (A) = ∅. But, then, for all a ∈ X, it holds that A |= V a. Given completeness, it follows that A ⊢ S a for all a ∈ A, that is, A is S-inconsistent. (contradiction!). ii. Consider A ⊆ X, V-satisfiable and assume, by reductio ad absurdum, that A is S-inconsistent, i.e, Cn S (A) = X. Given soundness, we have that
for all a ∈ X, i. e., v(a) = 1 for all a ∈ X, that is, v is the constant function 1 (contradiction with definition of V!). ✷ The notion of truth which is essential to semantics appear here as an ingredient of our valuation structures leading to the concept of semantical consequence operation Cn V . Up to now, we have settled basic usual terminology in order to separate between proof-theoretical and semantical consequence relations, and to show standard connections between them. From now on, we introduce some original concepts that constitute the main contribution of this paper.
Paradeduction
The philosophical motivation for the concept of paradeduction can be summarized in the following motto: always reason with consistent sets. In this sense, we provide a formalization of a practice already common when we need to deal with inconsistent data. For instance, Bohr's atomic model claims that there are electrons orbiting an atom's nucleus without radiating energy. However, according to Maxwell's equations -which are explicitly incorporated in Bohr's theory -an orbiting electron must radiate energy. In this scenario, the calculations were done by informally splitting the information into consistent subsets. The important thing to note is that in many different situations, when facing an inconsistent set of informations, we intuitively deal with consistent subsets of the original one. Here, we are trying to make this procedure explicit by formalizing it.
Let X be a set and consider a finite sequence of pairs a 1 ) , ..., (A n , a n ) such that A i ⊆ X and a i ∈ X, for 1 ≤ i ≤ n. We introduce, based on σ, two sequences given by: Π 1 σ := A 1 , ..., A n Π 2 σ := a 1 , ..., a n which are sequences composed by the first and second elements of the original sequence σ. Consider, now, an axiomatic formal system S = (X, A, R) and a subset A ⊆ X. A paradeduction in S from A is a finite sequence of pairs σ = (A 1 , a 1 ) , ..., (A n , a n ) for 1 ≤ i ≤ n, and A i ⊆ X, a i ∈ X such that: To illustrate, consider the following set of informations:
If classical logic is the logic underlying A, it is obvious one can produce a deduction such that A ⊢ c ∧ ¬c. However, in the case of a paradeduction, we should take into account only consistent subsets of A (in this case, A is the only set which should be disregarded). Then, a paradeduction would allow to infer c and to infer ¬c, but never their conjunction, as only consistent sets (of information) could be taken into consideration. (A 1 , a 1 ) , ..., (A n , a n ) be a paradeduction in S from A ⊆ X.
Lemma 4.1 Let
Proof. By definition, each A i , for 1 ≤ i ≤ n, is S-consistent. In addition, considering the itens in the definition of a paradeduction, either A i = ∅, or A i = {a i } or A i is the union of the previous A k 's . By induction, we have that A i ⊆ A, for all 1 ≤ i ≤ n. Consider a paradeduction given by: (A 1 , a 1 ) , ..., (A n , a n ).
For i = 1, we have two cases:
1. a 1 ∈ A. In this case, A 1 = {a 1 } and we have, given the first property of formal systems, that A 1 ⊢ S a 1 .
2. a 1 ∈ A. Here, A 1 = ∅ and we have, by the definition of deduction in S, that A 1 ⊢ S a 1 .
Suppose that A i ⊢ S a i , for 1 ≤ i ≤ k − 1, and consider (A k , a k ). We have, then, three cases: i. a k ∈ A; ii. a k ∈ A or iii. a k is obtained by an inference rule. In the first two cases, an argument analogous to the one above shows that A k ⊢ S a k . Now, for case (iii). Suppose a k is an immediate consequence of {a i 1 , ..., a i l } by the application of the rule R ∈ R. By induction hypothesis, we have that:
And, moreover, A k = l j=1 A i j is S-consistent. But, then, using properties (II) and (III) of S-deducibility, the sequence a i 1 , ..., a i l , a k is an S-deduction
Let S = (X, A, R) be a formal system, A ⊆ X and a ∈ X. We say that a is S-paradeductible from A if there is a paradeduction in S, (A 1 , a 1 ) , ..., (A n , a n ), from A such that a = a n . We use, to denote this fact, the notation:
Now we present a result that relates the notion of paradeducibility above with a construction proposed in [4] of a paraconsistentization functor in the category of consequence structures. Proposition 4.2 Let S = (X, A, R) be a formal system such that A ⊆ X and a ∈ X. Then, it holds that: A ⊢
P S a if and only if there is
Proof. (⇒) Suppose that A ⊢ P S a. Then, there is a paradeduction in S given by (A 1 , a 1 ) , ..., (A n , a n ) from A such that a = a n . By lemma 4.1, we have that A i is S-consistent, A i ⊆ A and A i ⊢ S a i , for all 1 ≤ i ≤ n. Thus, there is a n ⊆ A, S-consistent such that A n ⊢ S a. (⇐) Suppose that there is A ′ ⊆ A, S-consistent such that A ′ ⊢ S a. Consider, then, a S-deduction of a from A ′ given by: a 1 , ..., a n (= a).
Since all subset of A ′ is S-consistent (property VII), it is easy to convert the S-deduction above into a paradeduction in S: a 1 ) , ..., (A n , a n ) making
Consider, now, a valuation structure (X, V). Let A ⊆ X and a ∈ X. By definition, we already have that:
We define a relation of V-paraconsequence between A and a given by:
We have the following result:
Theorem 4.3 Let S = (X, A, R) be a formal system and (X, V) a valuation structure adequate for S. Then, for all A ⊆ X and a ∈ X, it is the case that:
By completeness, we have that A ′ ⊢ S a and, by soundness and lemma 3.1 (ii), A ′ is S-consistent. Thus, by proposition 4.2, A ⊢ P S a. ii. Suppose that A ⊢ P S a. By proposition 4.2, we have that there is A ′ ⊆ A, S-consistent such that A ′ ⊢ S a. By soundness, we have that A ′ |= V a and, by completeness and lemma 3.1 (i), A ′ is V-satisfiable. Thus, A |= P V a. ✷ The lesson of the theorem above shows that if a given logic developed by a formal system and a valuation structure is sound and complete, then the paraconsistentized version of it also has these properties. These are good news, especially because if one is dealing with a given theory which appears to be contradictory, then there is a guarantee that the underlying logic can be paraconsistentized in order to deal with these same contradictions as there is no doubt that the resulting paraconsistentized logic also has good metalogical properties and, therefore, replacing one explosive logic by a non-explosive one is legitimate operation.
Conclusion
The contribution of this paper lies on the role consistent sets plays in science, philosophy and reasoning in general. In ordinary life, we are recipients of many contradictory informations, and sometimes our convictions and theories are also contradictory. The main motto of this paper is that we can ignore pieces of contradictory information and concentrate only in consistent parts of it: always reason with consistent sets of information. This is indeed what occurs in Court of Law when a judge produces a decision or in philosophy when someone reasons with contradictory viewpoints. So, discussions regarding legal procedures as remarked in [3] or philosophical disputes can be regulated by our methodology of concentrating in consistent sets. This attitude seems to be similar to some operations in belief revision theory, especially those of contraction and revision studied and developed in [1] . It is also possible to explain early uses of calculus in a similar way. However, in this paper we have not explored these fruitful relationships further.
The approach developed here opens a line of research within the domain of paraconsistent logics. Before the development of the method presented here and elsewhere (see [4] ), some forms of paraconsistentization had to be "handcrafted", in the sense that it had to be done individually for each logic. For instance, Newton da Costa defined the consequence relation of paraclassical logic P as: A |= a if and only if there is A ′ ⊂ A, C-Consistent 2 , such that A ′ |= a. This is a specific procedure to turn classical logic into a paraconsistent logic. Our work consists on a generalization of this idea, allowing the abstraction of the notion of classically consistent to the notion of consistent in a given logic, that is, Cn-Consistent.
Another example would be Rescher and Manor's machinery for making inferences from inconsistent premises 3 . Here, the consequence relation is not restricted to mere consistent subsets of the original set, but to maximal consistent subsets 4 . The details are not important here. What matters is that, once again, we have a particular method for dealing with inconsistent information. With respect to the work of Rescher and Manor our paper allows a second level of abstraction. Not only we can make the notion of consistency relative to a given logic, we can also replace the consistency constraints for any other desired notion. Thus, Rescher and Manor's machinery becomes a particular case of our paraconsistentization method, when we change CnConsistent notion for Cn-maximally consistent. Depending on our goal, we could even replace the notion of consistency for some desired epistemic no-2 Where C denotes classical logic. 3 Cf. [7] . 4 This gives rise to the notion of weak and strong consequence. A proposition a is a weak consequence of a set A if and only if there is at least one A ′ ⊆ A-maximal consistent, such that a is a logical consequence of A ′ ; and a is a strong consequence of A if and only if it follows from all maximal consistent subsets of A.
tion, and investigate the resulting logic. So, compared to this individual ways of dealing with inconsistency that produces one paraconsistent logic at a time, our approach permits this transformation on a "industrial scale", creating infinitely many paraconsistent logics.
In addition to that, our paper also presents some contributions to belief revision theory. The main account of belief revision theory is the AGM approach. In it, theories are defined as sets closed under the consequence relation of classical logic. Thus any inconsistent theory is a trivial theory and the source of the inconsistency cannot be localized, making contraction 5 a somewhat arbitrary operation. Furhmann 6 develops a framework that is independent of classical logic. Hence, he can, in principle, accommodate inconsistent theories. But only in the sense that it allows to localize the inconsistency and then to perform a contraction to restore the theory's consistency. Indeed he claims that "restoring consistency is one of the major, if not the principal reason for contracting a theory" 7 . Paraconsistentization offers a different approach. When facing an inconsistent theory, we can paraconsistentize the original explosive logic, and reason with the consistent subsets of the theory. So, there is no need to contract a belief from a theory. The pragmatic advantage of one approach over the other has to be established on a case by case analysis. From a philosophical point of view, however, paraconsistentization shows that it is possible to reason with inconsistent theories without removing any of its propositions.
To conclude, it is important to say that this paper showed that soundness and completeness are invariant when logics are paraconsistentized. Other step is the investigation of problems in complexity theory. For instance, given a logic in which the satisfiability problem belongs to a given complexity class, what happens in the case of paraconsistentizing this logic? A conjecture is that complexity goes high, as the set of consistent subsets seems to increase. However, we do not have a proof of this fact. We conjecture also that if complexity decreases, then ways of paraconsistentizing can also be used to study some problems in the domain of advanced theoretical computer science. 5 The contraction of a proposition α from a theory Γ is a theory Γ ′ that does not contain -and does not imply -α, but it is in some sense similar to Γ. 6 Cf. [5] . 7 [5] , p. 187.
